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Abstract
The alliance literature is bifurcated between an empirically-driven approach utilizing
rigorous data, and a theoretically-motivated approach offering a rich conceptualiza-
tion of alliances. Within the strength of one, lays the weakness of the other. While
the former invokes a non-comprehensive view of alliances that emphasizes capability
aggregation, the latter does not provide a systematic or rigorous approach to uncover
empirical insights. I unify these perspectives, enumerating the roles a state can adopt
within the alliance network and considering the relationship between that role and
how they design their local alliance network to accomplish role-based objectives. To
uncover this variation, I employ a novel methodological tool, the ego-TERGM. Results
indicate that states form alliances to accomplish a variety of foreign policy objectives
beyond capability aggregation, including the consolidation of non-security ties and the
pursuit of domestic reforms in addition to security-based motivations.
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1 Introduction
Few international institutions are as ubiquitous as military alliances. With far reaching
consequences, interstate military alliances influence almost every aspect of international
politics. Even the foundational theory of international relations, balance of power theory, is
a theory about when states should aggregate their capabilities through alliances. However,
for a concept so integral to so many international processes and research areas in inter-
national relations, little attempt has been made to empirically examine variation in why
states form alliances. Since the foundation of international relations, alliances have been
considered a means of promoting state security through deterring attack, balancing com-
petitors, or preparing for an inevitable conflict (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979;
Mearsheimer, 2001; Johnson, 2017). Empirical approaches have largely mirrored this un-
derstanding (Lai and Reiter, 2000; Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al., 2002; Leeds, 2003a; Gibler
and Wolford, 2006), while a variety of theoretically-motivated studies have pushed back,
recognizing the variety of motives states may have for forming alliances (Morrow, 1991;
Schroeder, 1994, 1996; Kim, 2016; Henke, 2017). Recent empirical work has highlighted
that alliances may vary in their design (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al., 2002), but the ini-
tial conditions motivating their formation are thought to be relatively homogenous. While
theoretically-motivated scholars have been increasingly interested in empirically consider-
ing variation (Kim, 2016; Henke, 2017), it has been largely been limited to particular case
studies.
The previous discussion highlights two distinct approaches dominating the study of mil-
itary alliances. The peace science approach is empirically-driven and uses systematic and
rigorous data to uncover meaningful empirical insights about the causes and consequences
of alliances. The security studies approach is more theoretically motivated, using context
and diplomatic history to provide a rich and nuanced conceptualization of alliances. Unfor-
tunately, these approaches rarely engage with one another, and within the strength of one
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lays the weakness of the other. While the peace science approach yields tractable empirical
insights, it does so by invoking a flat and non-comprehensive view of alliances. This view
emphasizes the Capability Aggregation Model (CAM) which holds that states, motivated
by an external security threat, form alliances to aggregate capabilities and consolidate their
security. Many security studies scholars have long voiced their opposition, arguing that al-
liances are complex institutions, and states form alliances for a variety of motives. While
the security studies approach provides a means of understanding this nuance, generating
inferences is difficult as empirically assessing and generalizing this variation is difficult. In
this manuscript, I unify these perspectives, answering several questions: Are alliances only
formed to respond to external threats? Do contextual factors influence states’ motives for
forming alliances? How do we synthesize the parsimonious Capability Aggregation Model
with contextual factors? How do the objectives motivating alliance formation differ from one
another, and how would we measure these differences? Is this desire to differentiate alliances
analytically useful?
Synthesizing the peace science and security studies approach, I introduce a new role-
based framework for considering variation in alliance design and objective. This role-based
framework holds that states adopt roles within the alliance network that vary across sys-
temic context, and design their local alliance network to accomplish role-motivated objec-
tives. These roles are thought to vary across two dimensions – whether they are order
pursuing/preserving or narrowly utilitarian, and whether the aggregation of capabilities is
the chief means to accomplish their objectives or if institutional means are essential. States
may adopt the role of Balancer (Ordering, Capability Aggregating), Aggregator (Narrowly
Utilitarian, Capability Aggregating), Reformer (Ordering, Institutional), or Consolidator
(Narrowly Utilitarian, Institutional), each possessing its own logic and objectives motivating
local alliance network design. These roles are uncovered using the ego-Temporal Exponential
Random Graph Model (ego-TERGM), a novel statistical innovation that allows analysts to
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sort “ego-networks” (e.g. a state and their allies) into a finite number of clusters according
to similarity. This model allows for both the generation of data on roles and an assessment
of the generative process for these roles.
By synthesizing the richness of the security studies approach with the rigor of the peace
science approach, I find that the Capability Aggregation Model of alliances is inadequate
and that scholars should empirically consider the heterogeneous and non-security motives
driving states to form military alliances. While security-based roles are detected, states
are frequently found to form alliances to consolidate economic or political relationships and
to promote domestic reforms. The roles uncovered are also found to vary according to
historical context. This novel approach has far reaching implications for how IR scholars
consider alliance formation and evolution, and the consequences of different alliance types.
2 State Objectives Influencing Alliance Design
The literatures on alliance formation and maintenance span two schools with two distinct
approaches: peace science and security studies. The conventional wisdom in peace science,
and international relations broadly, is embodied by the parsimonious and generalizable Ca-
pability Aggregation Model (CAM). The CAM holds that states form and maintain alliances
to balance peer competitors, deter potential attack, improve bargaining power, or prepare
for what is perceived to be an inevitable conflict (Johnson, 2017). This perspective has dom-
inated the empirical literature on alliances as its parsimonious logic makes modeling alliance
behavior simple and tractable using existing data sources. While such motivations inform
many alliances, there remain cases that this logic cannot explain, including the enlarge-
ment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Waltz, 2000), the post-Cold War
evolution of the Organization of American States (OAS) (Pevehouse, 2005; The´rien, Mace,
and Gagne´, 2012), or the formation of the Economic Community of West African States
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(ECOWAS) (Ukeje, 2005). Security studies and diplomatic history, on the other hand, of-
fers nuanced explanations for why particular alliances form and evolve without emphasizing
generalizable or empirically-oriented logics capable of detecting such patterns.
In other words, within the strength of one approach lies the weakness of the other. While
international relations and peace science possesses a generalizable and parsimonious model of
alliances that travels to many cases and makes empirical modeling easy, it fails in explaining
a great many important alliances. While security studies and diplomatic history can offer
nuance and explain the contexts driving particular alliances, it lacks a general framework
capable of detecting consistent logics. In this manuscript I argue that a synthesis of these
approaches is necessary to further theoretical and empirical innovation.
2.1 Alliances as Responses to External Threats
The peace science approach, the dominant perspective within international relations, holds
that states, motivated by some common external threat aggregate their capabilities to in-
crease their security, bargaining power, and/or war-fighting capabilities beyond what they
would be in the absence of a formal obligation alone (Morrow, 2000; Johnson, 2017). This
perspective is attractive for empirical modeling as it allows the analyst to assume there is a
homogenous data generating process.1 This view was propagated by early Realists and has
dominated international relations since its founding.
In his call for a scientific study of international politics, Carr (1939) critiqued Interwar
foreign policymaking which prioritized ideals to a pursuit of the national interest. This view,
formalized by Morgenthau (1948), identifies national power as the chief motive of states.
Implicit to this logic is that states seek power to secure their sovereignty from external
threats, and that at times, alliances may be necessary to ensure security. While many
1This perspective was certainly not created by peace scientists, nor is it only adopted by peace scientists or
the only perspective within peace science. Regardless, I label this perspective the peace science approach as
it is the modal perspective in peace science, which is one of the most active literatures and most empirically-
oriented literatures on alliances.
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have debated the precise conditions necessitating such power politics and alliance decisions
(Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1990; Mearsheimer, 2001), the consequence is the same: states form
alliances to secure their survival against external threats. Once these threats are removed,
their corresponding alliances should dissolve (Morrow, 1991, 904).
With the quantitative shift in international relations and the rise of peace science, the
empirical work on alliances has largely adopted these parsimonious assumptions. Invoking
this assumption makes modeling challenges much more tractable as analysts can assume
there is a homogenous data generating process that is easily measurable. Early quantitative
work on alliances emerged from the Correlates of War (COW) Project which coded alliances
according to whether the alliance was a defense pact, a neutrality and non-aggression pact,
or an entente (Singer and Small, 1966). These data have been used to examine many
questions, including the factors influencing alliance formation (Lai and Reiter, 2000) and
whether alliances deter or provoke conflict (Singer and Small, 1966; Smith, 1995; Gibler and
Wolford, 2006). Building upon this dataset, Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al. (2002) introduced
the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset which included additional
data on aspects of alliance design. These data represent the state of the art and have allowed
for a more rigorous examination of the factors underlying alliance formation (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell et al., 2002; Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland, 2012; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Menninga, 2012), and its effects on conflict (Leeds, 2003b), trade (Long and Leeds, 2006;
Fordham, 2010) and more (Benson and Clinton, 2016).2
It is not the COW or ATOP coding decisions that are problematic, but rather an ana-
lyst’s comfortability in assuming a homogenous data generating process, treating alliances
as varying only in commitment and not objective. There are several challenges to this ap-
proach. First, Diplomatic Historians have long noted that the empirical record challenges
the “no functional differentiation” assumption, arguing that states perform highly special-
2There are many other well known and widely cited articles I would like to mention here, but journals
have word limits.
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ized functions (Schroeder, 1994). Consider the OAS, an alliance formed to counter Soviet
expansion into the Western Hemisphere, only to update its primary mission following the
Cold War – to accomplish a series of non-security goals including political and economic
liberalization (Pevehouse, 2005; The´rien, Mace, and Gagne´, 2012). Second, world politics
reflects a highly dynamic system where a variety of time varying material and immaterial
forces influence state behavior. Failing to model alliances as a function of this dynamic sys-
tem may produce flawed inferences, as noted by Jenke and Gelpi (2016). As such, treating
alliances and their formational logic as time invariant may produce flawed inferences.
Unit and temporal heterogeneity in alliance decision-making has certainly been explored
by IR scholars, but never in a systematic way that posits a framework capable of competing
with the CAM, leaving much of the work on alliance heterogeneity to diplomatic history and
security studies. Holsti (1970) enumerated the foreign policy roles states adopted during the
Cold War, which almost certainly influenced their motives for forming alliances. An early
piece by Russett used factor analysis to cluster alliances on a variety of background and
output variables to produce an alliance typology based upon an alliance’s distribution of
capabilities (Russett, 1971). In a recent study Benson and Clinton (2016) consider variation
in the commitments enshrined in treaties, but does not consider the motivations for distinct
commitments. The effect of alliances on conflict are also thought to differ before and after the
advent of nuclear weapons (Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers, 2015). Existing understandings
of alliance heterogeneity have failed to articulate a theoretical or empirical framework capable
of explaining why alliances are formed or evolve to accomplish objectives beyond those
outlined by the CAM.
2.2 Alliances as Heterogenous Institutions
While diplomatic historians have certainly championed balance of power theory (Taylor,
1954), the modal approach holds that alliances possess a great degree of specialization and
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are used to accomplish many objectives (Schroeder, 1994; Kissinger, 1994; Schroeder, 1996;
Bridge and Bullen, 2014). In his well known retort to Waltz (1979), Schroeder (1994) argues
that states have unique logics of political survival and have sought survival through perform-
ing specialized roles (125). This call for nuance in treating alliances as institutions formed
for a variety of reasons, while largely falling on deaf ears within mainstream international
relations, has been recently heralded by security studies scholars.
States have different logics of political survival and have different instruments for achiev-
ing them. This functional differentiation in the roles adopted and performed by states has
significant consequences for how and why states form alliances. The objective of the United
States following World War II was to contain the Soviet Union through establishing alliances
in any area at risk of communist infiltration (Holsti, 1970; Kissinger, 1994). The Chief Bal-
ancer role ascribed to and adopted by the United States was well understood and certainly
transformed the US’ incentive structure, driving it to design its local alliance network to be
consistent with this role. Following the Cold War, the US is widely thought to adopt the new
role as Hegemon, a promoter of a global order based upon liberal institutions (Ikenberry,
2012). The US and its allies adjusted their existing alliance network accordingly, bringing
former Soviet satellites into NATO and establishing a new mission for the OAS.
This nuanced view is standard within diplomatic history and security studies, with schol-
ars offering rich and sophisticated narratives for the historical context of each state, and how
the position ascribed to them informs how they design alliances (Schroeder, 1994, 1996; Iken-
berry, 2012; Bridge and Bullen, 2014; Kim, 2016; Henke, 2017). While many mainstream IR
scholars or peace scientists might argue that the alliance system constructed by Metternich
following the Concert of Vienna was an attempt to aggregate Russian, Prussian, and Aus-
trian capabilities to prevent the return of Napoleon or to counter a very dominant United
Kingdom (Jervis, 1992), many diplomatic historians are quick to recognize that the Holy
Alliance was a pact among autocrats to protect sovereigns against rising nationalism and
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to promote a new order based upon cooperation (Schroeder, 1992). Within security stud-
ies, theoretically-motivated work has explored variation in why states contract alliances.
In criticizing the CAM and its inability to explain alliances formed between great powers
and weak powers, Morrow (1991) introduced the Security-Autonomy Tradeoff Model which
sought to explain the asymmetric gains of states forming alliances. Relatedly, Kim (2016)
has introduced a market theory of alliances, viewing alliances as a good exchanged between
states wherein security may be exchanged for concessions in other areas. Additionally, Henke
(2017) explores how a variety of non-military factors influence a state’s admittance to a mul-
tilateral military coalition. While these are just examples from a much broader literature,
a common thread has been the development of sophisticated and rich understandings and
theories of alliances.
Unfortunately, diplomatic historians and security studies scholars often lack parsimonious
and generalizable frameworks for considering alliances or detecting patterns of alliance be-
havior. They bring rich nuance to the study of alliances, often at the cost of producing
systematic or rigorous empirical insights or predictions. As Jervis (1992) notes, one large
attraction of the IR approach to considering alliances is that it is relatively straightforward,
parsimonious, and with a few simple assumptions it can explain a “great deal of behav-
ior that has taken place over tens of centuries under widely differing circumstances.” This
generalizability, a strength of the IR approach, is certainly a significant weakness of the
diplomatic history approach to studying alliances.
How might one synthesize these rich and context-based understandings of alliances with
the generalizable models that interest IR scholars and peace scientists? In the following
section I attempt to answer this question by introducing a new role-based framework for
considering military alliances, combining the richness of diplomatic history and security
studies with the empirically-motivated peace science tradition.
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3 The Role Framework of Alliance Politics
In this section a role-based framework for considering alliances is presented. The intention
is not to explicitly theorize about why states adopt certain roles or to be exhaustive in
enumerating the innumerable specialized roles a state may adopt. Instead, the focus is to
discuss what a “role” is within the context of the alliance network, what these functionally
differentiable roles might look like, what general patterns in roles might be detected, how
they might be differentiated, and how they may vary as a function of time and system
features.
It is worth mentioning that the roles that actors adopt are undeniably dynamic and
informed by systemic factors. A broader discussion of this temporal heterogeneity and
system-based expectation is included in the Supplementary Information (SI) Appendix. I
explicitly model this heterogeneity when later assessing this framework.
3.1 Roles and the Alliance Network
Within international relations and political science broadly, the dominant understanding of
roles stems from Wendt (1999). For Wendt, a role is the cultural position an actor performs
by occupying a place within a social structure and observing behavioral norms towards
Others who perform a counter-role (Wendt, 1999, 227). Roles, as they are discussed in
this manuscript, differ from Wendt’s understanding. Social roles, as discussed here, refer
to cultural objects that are widely accepted and understood within a given community
and used to accomplish certain objectives (Campbell, 2018). This definition is similar to
Wendt’s in that roles are attributes of a broader system and are rooted in certain repeated
and emergent practices. While both understand roles as structural features, Wendt views
them as mutually constitutive while I view them as purpose-based.
In other words, I believe that states have more agency in making these decisions. In
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addition, role need not necessarily precede behavior, in some cases role may be adopted to
conform to current behavior. Within the context of the alliance network, a network defined
by states related to one another through the presence of shared alliance treaties, states may
adopt whatever roles their alters and the broader system will allow them to.
This view of states stands in contrast to the strong assumption often invoked that states
are not functionally differentiable, that they only differ with respect to relative capabilities
(Waltz, 1979; Schroeder, 1994). If states behave differently based upon observable roles,
then the theoretical underpinnings for much of modern international relations theory must
be reevaluated. In the following section I give cause for such concern.
3.2 Roles and Objectives for Alliance Formation
As previously noted, and discussed in Holsti (1970), the CAM holds that states only form
alliances to further objectives consistent with one of three roles: Balancer, Aggressor, or
Defender. It is undeniable that across time and space, this capability-aggregation function
of alliances is a constant. The stated role of the US and other NATO members as both
Balancers and Defenders during the Cold War is clear (Holsti, 1970). What is less clear
is whether one can say that these roles persist when the supposed Aggressor, the USSR,
dissolves. Without a clear threat or motive, the CAM cannot make sense of NATO’s post-
Cold War expansion (Morrow, 1991; Waltz, 2000).
To make sense of this puzzle, I introduce a role-based framework for considering alliances.
This approach differs from the much narrower CAM by positing that states may have mo-
tives for adopting roles that are not simply motivated by countering external threats. The
framework presented here holds that there are four “types” of states in the alliance network
that are characterized by the role adopted and their expected behavior. These roles are
sorted according to two characteristics, forming the configuration presented in Table 1.
The first significant dimension that may sort alliances is whether the alliance is formed
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for some order-based objective or whether the alliance should be considered narrowly util-
itarian (Lake, 2009b; Schweller and Pu, 2011; Ikenberry, 2012, 2014). When considering
order, one must consider the role of ideology which certainly informs an actor’s preferences
with respect to ideal orders. Within this context, the international orders pursued by states
“represent sets of governing arrangements, rules, and norms designed to secure the con-
stituent units against external threat, at the cost of limiting their autonomy,” (Braumoeller,
2018). The particular set of arrangement, rues, and norms are often an outcome reached
through bargaining among states (Lake, 2009a). Alternatively, alliances may be pursued for
narrowly utilitarian reasons, as is usually thought. These motives span beyond the pursue
of some ideal international order into a variety of other considerations such as deterrence,
conflict preparation, or even the non-security externalities associated with alliances.
The second dimension that alliances may be thought to vary along is the function of
capability aggregation in accomplishing the alliance’s objectives. Some alliances may have
underlying objectives that are predicated upon the aggregation of resources, such as balanc-
ing alliances, while others may not and may emphasize alliances as non-security institutions,
such as consolidating alliances (Morrow, 1991; Weitsman, 2004). In peacetime, alliances
may become an institutional means of promoting policy coordination and accomplishing
non-security objectives (Gibler and Nieman, 2018). One interesting question is why states
may use military alliances over other forms of international institutions when seeking to con-
solidate, expand, or pursue relationships. Alliances are often the institution most frequently
associated with high-level dialogue between between influential civil and military leaders,
empowering them to accomplish these institutionalizing pursuits better than other forms
of institutions, such as economic institutions (Pevehouse, 2005; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Campbell, 2018). When these two dimensions are combined, much can be learned about
alliance roles.
The first role, Balancer, is reflective of conventional balance of power logic wherein capa-
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Ordering Narrowly Utilitarian
Capability Aggregating Balancers Aggregators
Institutional Reformers Consolidators
Table 1: Dimensions Sorting Alliance Roles. Alliances can be thought to vary accord-
ing to whether they are ordering or narrowly utilitarian, and whether this is accomplished
through capability aggregation or institutional mechanisms.
bilities are aggregated to achieve order-based goals. The second role, Aggregator, refers to a
state that aggregates its capabilities by allying with others to counter a geopolitical threat
and/or prepare for an inevitable conflict. These motives are agnostic to the broader interna-
tional order. The third, Reformer, is representative of a process where alliances are a means
to promote internal reform within a state. These reforms are promoted through institutional
means, not necessarily security-based means, to pursue order-based motivations. The fourth
and final role breaks from conventional wisdom, Consolidators may form alliances to con-
solidate economic or political ties through institutionalized arrangements. Often these ties
may be formed without paying close attention to broader international orders or capability
aggregation. It is worth noting that these four roles may not be the only roles adopted
within the alliance network or the only type of alliances formed. Alliances can be formed to
serve a variety of purposes, as illustrated in Figure 1 which shows the tree of alliance types
and general levels of abstraction. These roles, however, are consistent with general patterns
that are expected to be the most prominent.
It is worth clarifying what I mean when I refer to alliances within this conceptual frame-
work. Alliances, for the purposes outlined here, are defined in a way consistent with the
ATOP project: “Alliances are written agreements, signed by official representatives of at
least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one
another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential
for military conflict,” (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al., 2002, 238). Here, alliances are not de-
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Figure 1: Alliance Typology Tree. Tree ascends in increasing order of abstraction.
All types of alliances belong to particular roles, which belong to particular models, which
broadly capture all alliances.
fined with respect to their motive of aggregating power but rather as a treaty that contains
provisions relating to security politics. While these provisions may be important to the al-
liance, the alliance need not be formed solely for these provisions. In fact, an institutionalist
view of alliances may view such provisions as tertiary to the objective of forming a broader
institution designed to accomplish other objectives.
3.2.1 Balancer
It is conventionally thought that a state’s primary foreign policy objective is to ensure
its security, often through countering the rise of a revisionist state or peer competitor, or
preserving an ideal international order. Balancers aggregate resources to promote an ideal
international order or preserve an existing international order. Capability aggregation occurs
through the formation of alliances with like-minded states intended to maintain the balance
of power (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1990; Mearsheimer, 2001). The aforementioned example of the
US forming NATO following World War II exemplifies a state adopting the role of Balancer
(Holsti, 1970). With a liberal order in mind, NATO was formed to aggregate capability to
encircle the Soviet Union. It may be argued that for states to be Balancers, they need not
have common interests. This is certainly true, in the case presented here, however, these
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states are aggregating capabilities for narrowly utilitarian objectives, and as such, may be
thought of as Aggregators.
The alliance behavior of both the state being balanced and the target of balancing,
however, may often resemble one another. For example, during the Cold War the alliance
behavior of both the US and the USSR are relatively similar. In other words, even if a state
is the target of balancing attempts, they too may adopt the role of Balancer to serve as a
counterweight to the new balancing coalition.
The local alliance network of Balancers may have four observable features. Recent re-
search has indicated that when constructing balancing coalitions, states create a larger coali-
tion that includes many states as it lends legitimacy to their cause and the order they are
attempting to preserve or establish (Keohane and Nye, 1974; Adler, 2008; Adler and Greve,
2009; Ikenberry, 2014). This tendency can be measured through two network features. First,
the local alliance network of Balancers should show a tendency towards many “high-degree”
nodes. Figure 2a presents the topographical representation of preferential attachment, often
measured through k-stars wherein a node i is connected to j and k but j and k are not
connected. Second, these local alliance networks should be tightly knit and marked by a
tendency towards triadic closure, illustrated in Figure 2b. This tight clustering would be
an indication of similar preferences and a costly signal of the coalition’s cohesiveness (Keo-
hane and Nye, 1974; Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga, 2012; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Kirkland, 2012).
Third, as Balancers may be forming alliances to uphold a particular order, it seems likely
that they would form alliances with states of similar regime types. States with similar regime
types often have similar international preferences and are more likely to have similar foreign
policy objectives (Gartzke, 1998, 2000). The Holy Alliance following the Congress of Vienna
seems to be a strong case of states of the same regime type having domestic incentives to
uphold a conservative international order.
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(a) K-Stars or Preferential Attachment (b) Triadic Closure
Figure 2: Triadic Configurations. K-stars may be reflective of a tendency towards
preferential attachment, triangles measure triadic closure.
Forth and finally, as states attempt to increase the strength of their balancing and order-
preserving coalitions, or to aggregate resources, it may seem possible that stronger states may
have to form alliances with weaker states, contrary to the expectations of the CAM (Morrow,
1991). While there are increased autonomy costs for adding additional states (Morrow, 1991,
2000), adding even weaker states will still marginally increase the overall size, strength,
and perceived legitimacy of a coalition. As such, one counter-intuitive expectation of this
framework may be a tendency towards asymmetric alliances (with respect to capabilities)
within the local alliance network of Balancers. As previously mentioned, Balancing coalitions
can also be engineered by revisionist states so it does not seem obvious that the local alliance
network of Balancers should be truly marked by a tendency towards forming alliances with
revisionist/non-revisionist states.
3.2.2 Aggregator
An Aggregator attempts to aggregate capabilities to prepare for conflict, a motive that is
agnostic to the broader international order. This role is fairly consistent with the logic of the
CAM. Balancers form alliances as a means of pooling resources for creating or maintaining
an international order, which may manifest through a desire to constrain a peer competitor
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and/or promoting a balance of power. Aggregators, however, form alliances to pool resources
to prepare for what is perceived to be an inevitable conflict. Consider the case of Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay in the Triple Alliance which marks a clear example of states coming
together to prepare for a conflict, in this case, the Paraguayan War (1864-1870).
Aggregators’ alliance networks should be marked by several characteristics. First and
foremost, Aggregators pay greater attention to the capabilities of their allies than Balancers.
Given that Aggregators form alliances based upon the expectation of an inevitable conflict,
alliance-based autonomy costs and the security gains are much more salient (Morrow, 1991;
Snyder, 1997; Morrow, 2000). However, forming alliances with equally strong states may
be difficult as there are constraints on available allies and sub-optimal alliances may exist.
As such, while it is expected that Aggregators do not form asymmetric alliances, they may
not be able to form perfectly symmetric ones either. Second, if Aggregators believe that
a conflict is inevitable, they may seek out many alliance partners and downplay autonomy
costs. As such, it might be expected to find a tendency similar to that of Balancers wherein
the local network of Aggregators is constituted by many high-degree nodes. This is measured
through k-stars or a degree term, illustrated through Figure 2a.
Third, similar to Balancers, Aggregators may be more likely to form tightly knit alliance
networks marked by a tendency towards triadic closure, illustrated in Figure 2b. As Cran-
mer, Desmarais, and Kirkland (2012) note, this may help bolster states’ security through
providing synergetic gains. Fourth, and finally, states are said to make decisions about al-
liance reliability based upon attributes of potential partners (Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg
et al., 2012). Lai and Reiter (2000) finds that democracies can more credibly commit their
reliability as allies to one another. In addition, autocracies may be more trusting of one an-
other as they may have similar preferences (Gartzke, 2000). As such, regime type homophily
is expected to be a common feature of an Aggregator’s local alliance network. As Aggre-
gator’s alliances may be fleeting alliances of convenience and include strange bedfellows, a
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tendency towards including revisionist or non-revisionist states does not seem likely.
3.2.3 Reformer
The Reformer role is associated with states forming alliances as a means to push or be pushed
by others to adopt internal reforms, likely economic or political liberalization, or influence
policy. The effect of alliances on political reforms or policy change is well documented (Peve-
house, 2005; Gibler and Wolford, 2006; Gibler and Nieman, 2018), but typically considered
as a positive externality as opposed to a chief motivation for alliance formation. Consider
the revised mission of the OAS following the Cold War. Initially formed to expel Soviet
influence in Latin America, the OAS was reorganized around a renewed set of principles,
including a regionalist cooperative security order and respect for human rights, economic
freedom, and liberal democracy (Pevehouse, 2005; The´rien, Mace, and Gagne´, 2012). These
new principles were consistent with the broader liberal internationalist order pursued by the
West (Ikenberry, 2012).
Reformers are likely to have ego-networks that mirror the structure of Consolidators.
Similar to the prior alliance roles, Reformers should have ego-networks constituted by many
high-degree nodes. As the institutions designed to push reforms are typically very large and
designed to form regional institutions, it seems inevitable that there would be many reform
pushers and many reform pushees that are all interacting within a very large community.
Second, given that these institutions largely work through socialization (Pevehouse, 2005),
a series of tightly knit alliance clusters seems to be essential to success. If particular states
were excluded from the community, then their socializing effects may not be as successful.
Third, Reformers’ alliance networks are more likely to be constituted by many asymmet-
ric alliances. Within asymmetric dyads, stronger states may be able to exercise a greater
degree of influence over weaker states in pushing their preferred policy outcomes, in this
case, domestic reform (Morrow, 1991). Fourth, initially, the alliance networks formed by
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Reformers should be constituted by regime heterophily, only to eventually be marked by
regime homophily as reforms become successfully implemented. When used as a vector for
the diffusion of democracy, it is expected that reformers would be democracies forming al-
liances with autocratic reformees. This dynamic is well documented, the US is often known
to use alliances like the OAS to promote democratization abroad (Pevehouse, 2005; The´rien,
Mace, and Gagne´, 2012).
3.2.4 Consolidator
Finally, Consolidators form alliances to institutionalize existing economic or political ties or
coordinate policy action. This role has become more prevalent as it is increasingly common
for states to use alliances to facilitate and institutionalize economic, political, or cultural
exchange (Long and Leeds, 2006; Lake, 2009b; Fordham, 2010). These peacetime alliances
may be be particularly useful in coordinating policy action (Gibler and Nieman, 2018). In
these cases the states may be agnostic to the broader order to capability aggregation and
see the alliance as a useful institutional mechanism to consolidate a relationship (Powers,
2004). In the post-Napoleonic system, the German kingdoms, Prussia, and Austria formed
alliances to pave way for the German Confederation and eventually, German Unification
(Hartshorne, 1950; Craig and George, 1995).
Consolidators’ ego-networks are likely to mirror those of Balancers and Aggregators with
respect to network topology. First, Consolidators are likely to have alliance networks consti-
tuted by many high-degree nodes. Once states decide to adopt this role, they turn towards
creating institutional arrangements with many states. German Unification highlights this
point clearly – many kingdoms like Bavaria or Hanover formed many dyadic alliances with
other kingdoms in an effort to bring many into the fold. Second, there is likely to be a
tendency towards triadic closure as these states seek to form tightly knit communities to
assist consolidation. In the case of German Unification, it would make little sense for some
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kingdoms to exclude others if the goal is to create a truly pan-Germanic community.
Consolidators are likely to form alliances with states of disparate capabilities and regime
types. Consolidators’ alliance ties may be more likely to emerge between states of disparate
national capabilities as there is greater potential for heterophilous gains. If two states have
an interest in forming a firm relationship and seek heterophilous gains from one another,
alliances may be an optimal institution allowing for such concessions and side payments
(Morrow, 1991; Fordham, 2010). For example, a stronger state may seek trade concessions
from a weaker state, but to give such concessions, the weaker state may demand defense.
These asymmetric alliances may provide a means to consolidate such ties. Fourth, and
finally, alliances may provide a means of bringing states of disparate regime types together.
Alliances are often considered a trust building mechanism (Kydd, 2001) and their effect in
promoting preference conference is well known (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007).
4 Empirical Strategy
This section introduces an empirical strategy for evaluating the previously introduced role-
based framework. It begins by introducing the ego-Temporal Exponential Random Graph
Model (ego-TERGM), a model capable of identifying the previously discussed roles. The fol-
lowing subsection then discusses details of each model estimated, including the time periods
used, the number of roles estimated, and the covariates used. It is worth noting that some
states may enter analyses for certain periods, this occurs as states may form or dissolve, or
not achieve the minimum number of alliances needed for any year within a period.
4.1 Inferring Alliance Roles Using the ego-TERGM
To assess this role-based framework a novel statistical approach, the ego-Temporal Expo-
nential Random Graph Model (ego-TERGM), is used. This approach, outlined by Campbell
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(2018), decomposes a longitudinal network (such as the alliance treaty network) into its com-
ponent ego-networks and clusters them according to similarity or difference across a variety
of user-specified nodal, dyadic, temporal, or network variables. In other words, if one views
the interstate alliance network as constituted by a set of states and their allies, one may
infer the roles states serve in the alliance network through examining patterns of how and
why states form alliances.
Previous work has indicated that the ego-TERGM, and its equivalent for cross-sectional
networks, the ego-Exponential Random Graph Model (ego-ERGM), is useful for uncovering
interesting properties of a network (Salter-Townshend and Murphy, 2015; Box-Steffensmeier,
Campbell, Christenson et al., 2017; Campbell, 2018). Box-Steffensmeier, Campbell, Chris-
tenson et al. (2017) used the ego-ERGM to examine the roles that interest groups adopt
within the environmental lobbying coalition. In examining a canonical social network, Camp-
bell (2018) uncovers a set of roles reflecting a unique aspect of labor negotiations and col-
lective action in non-union shops.
In simple terms, the ego-TERGM clusters a set of nodes and their local networks (ego-
networks) within a broader longitudinal network into a user-defined number of time-invariant
classes (clusters or roles) according to the similarity of these ego-networks (TERGM model
parameters). In more formal language, the ego-TERGM is a finite mixture model that at-
tempts to assess mixtures of data generating processes (DGPs) for bootstrapped Temporal
Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs) (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2010; Campbell,
2018). This is accomplished through assigning each actor’s longitudinal ego-network to a
cluster according to the similarity in each network’s TERGM parameters, which characterize
the generating process for the network. This model is an unsupervised and finite latent class
model based upon the clustering of TERGM parameters, meaning that cluster memberships
are determined entirely by estimated parameters. For additional detail on the ego-TERGM,
including its likelihood function, assumptions, estimation routine, and goodness of fit mea-
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sures, the reader is referred to Campbell (2018) and/or the SI Appendix.
The requirement that the analyst assign labels and meaning to each cluster is a limitation
to any study that uses unsupervised machine learning to measure otherwise immeasurable
phenomena. Nevertheless, the alternatives to this relatively inductive approach are much
worse. Analysts either treat all alliances as capability aggregation by assumption, or they
take the historian’s approach of being inductive about every case such that there is no
structure. I mitigate the issue of inductive or ex post label assignment through developing
a theoretical framework that provides a priori expectations about which roles or clusters
should exist and which states should be assigned to these roles, and deductive observable
implications that may be captured via ego-network structure. In other words, while my
approach may be inductive, I am principled and systematic in how I interpret raw historical
data and cluster assignments, similar to how Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors use history
in a systematic empirical basis (Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; Bueno de
Mesquita, 2011).
In this model the user must specify a set of parameters. This includes the minimum size
an ego-network must achieve to be included in the analysis, the order of alters to include,
the (T)ERG-based terms that roles are thought to sort on, and the number of roles that
the model is allowed to fit. For the models presented here, a state must have at least five
allies to be included in the model. This parameter value is chosen to increase the number
of states considered for role assignments while also achieving a minimum size necessary to
allow for model identifiability. Only first order alters are examined as the allies of allies may
not be thought to inform a state’s role assignment. In the following section the terms used
to sort states are discussed. Finally, in allowing the data to speak to the number of roles
present, model BIC is allowed to inform the role assignment. It is worth noting that in some
cases theoretically-motivated constraints are imposed to prevent the model from selecting
role cluster values that may be unacceptable, in this case, in excess of four total clusters of
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roles.
4.2 Data to Distinguish Alliance Roles
This section discusses the model terms used to distinguish between role assignments, how
they are measured, where they are sourced, and what constitutes the longitudinally observed
network(s). The analysis starts from a dyad-year dataset of all alliance treaties coded by
the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset from 1816 to 2002 (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell et al., 2002). These dyad-years are transformed into an undirected longitudinal
network observed over 187 annually measured time steps. A tie is present within this network
when any two states are member to a treaty containing an offensive, defensive, neutrality, or
non-aggression commitment. The broader network of all treaties is preferred to the narrower
network of particular commitments for two reasons. First, for non-CAM roles, commitment
may be independent of the role adopted. For example, Consolidators and Reformers focus
more upon the treaty and less upon the particular commitment when forming an institution.
Second, the presence of certain commitments over others may assist in distinguishing between
particular roles. While there are no strong a priori reasons to suspect some roles would
prioritize some commitments to others, including covariates for particular commitments
allows the ego-TERGM to leverage additional information in producing role assignments.
These networks are then partitioned into six historical time periods that are each analyzed
distinctly. These time periods are chosen to reflect the dynamic nature of state motives and
the means through which distinct international systems or orders may influence the roles
states adopt within the alliance network.For a further discussion of these periods and the
roles expected during them, the reader is referred to the SI Appendix.
During each of these periods, I search the parameter space of models that are identi-
fiable and produce the best fitting number of roles (or clusters) according to BIC while
constraining the value to ensure parsimony. When constraints are imposed they are done
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in a theoretically-motivated fashion to induce parsimonious assignments. Table 2 presents
information on the models estimated on each of these time-periods.
To distinguish between the roles adopted during this time I employ a variety of covariates
that are used to distinguish each longitudinally observed ego-network.3 First, a simple edges
term is used to distinguish between networks as one might expect roles to sort on the relative
density of actors’ ego-networks. In other words, this model would be used to detect the
number of dyadic alliances present in an ego-network. Second, a measure for the number
of k-stars within the network is used. Some roles may sort on k-stars as actors similar
to Bismarck attempt to create dominant and expedient coalitions without becoming fully
embedded, or attempt to form alliances with many different states. Alternating k-stars is
chosen to assist in model estimation. Third, a homophily term for regime type is used. This
term captures the tendency of a state to form alliance with states of a similar or different
regime type and can capture the formation of ideological communities. Data for this variable
is taken from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2002), where a democracy
is coded as any state with a regime score greater than 6 and a non-democracy is coded as
any state with a regime score less than 7.4
In addition, two “difference” variables are used to capture the tendency of two nodes
to have disparate values on a variable. The fourth term included measures the tendency
for states to form alliances with either stronger or weaker states. It is measured by the
absolute difference in CINC scores for a dyad, with data sourced from the Correlates of
War Project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). The fifth term included accounts for the
absolute difference in binary indicators for whether a state is labeled as a revisionist state
3The distributions of these covariates, their coding rules, and original data sources are discussed further
in the SI Appendix.
4It is possible that states may seek out or seek to avoid autocratic regimes of a particular type when
forming alliances (Weeks, 2008). Democracies may be more likely to push for domestic reforms in autocratic
military regimes. Accounting for variation in autocracy poses a tremendous modeling challenge as some
autocratic types may not exist during some years, and as such, create model identifiability issues. As such,
a broader understanding of autocracy is adopted here.
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in a militarized dispute in that year. Data for this variable is also taken from the Correlates
of War Project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996).
Four attributes of the alliance are also used to distinguish between roles (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell et al., 2002). The sixth, seventh, and eights terms included are whether an alliance
formed contains a defensive, offensive, and/or secret commitment respectively. Many alliance
roles may sort on these covariates as states engineer and design their alliances to accomplish
goals consistent with their role. It is worth noting that when including these commitment-
based covariates, the baseline category for treaties becomes the presence of a non-aggression
or neutrality pact. The last attribute is the number of years a dyad has had an alliance treaty.
This variable is designed to capture the temporal dependence that may exist between alliance
years.5
It is worth noting that the choice of some covariates is constrained by whether there
is variability for each dyad within an ego-network with respect to certain covariates. For
example, in some periods there is no variability in a state’s ego-network with respect to
offensive commitments. This invariability prevents the ego-TERGM from being identifiable
for the broader network as initial parameter values cannot be estimated for all states. For
example, edge covariates for whether the alliance developed established institutions or was
formed to counter common enemies were not included as they created identification problems.
The inclusion of a term for the number of triangles in a network also created problems as
alliance ego-networks often reflect fully connected networks, and as such, also do not vary
in dyadic change statistics.6
5While the inclusion squared and cubed functions of alliance years may be ideal (Carter and Signorino,
2010), their inclusion creates model identifiability problems.
6It should be noted that the terms discussed here and used for the ego-TERGM differ from those later
used to detect commonalities in ego-network structure among states of the same role.
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System or Period Time Span Num. Roles Fit Covariates Used
Congress of Vienna 1816-1848 3
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Defensive Commitments, Alliance Years
Nationalism and Bismarckian 1849-1890 4
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Defensive Commitments, Alliance Years
Pre-WW1 1891-1918 2
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Defensive Commitments, Offensive Commitments,
Secret Provisions, Alliance Years
Interwar 1919-1945 1
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Defensive Commitments, Offensive Commitments,
Alliance Years
Containment and Bipolar 1946-1991 4
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Alliance Years
Liberal International 1992-2002 4
Edges, Alternating K-Stars (0.5), Regime Homophily,
CINC Difference, Revisionist Difference,
Alliance Years
Table 2: Model Fit Details: Each row represents the model estimated and presented for
each time period and the information relevant to its estimation.
5 Results and Discussion
The results for my analyses uncover a role-structure consistent with the previously introduced
role framework of alliances.7 Alliances, it appears, are formed for a variety of purposes
beyond those expected by the Capability Aggregation Model. In particular, across time
states form alliances to adopt non-security aggregating roles, including Consolidator and
Reformer. The results for each period are discussed in turn.8 This section will discuss each
period and the roles uncovered, in turn, and conclude by discussing the generative structure
for each role.
7Models were validated using a combination of within-sample validation based on BIC for the number of
roles fit parameter and external validation based upon historical expectation. Given that labels and roles
are not known a priori cross validation of role assignments is not possible. A broader discussion of model
validation is provided in the SI Appendix.
8When discussing the roles states adopt within each period, it is important to note that these results
are based upon general patterns of behavior consistent across all states included. There may occasionally
be country-to-country differences in how these roles are performed, which may be nuances too subtle to be
teased out.
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5.1 Period Roles
5.1.1 Vienna System Roles
In the years following the Napoleonic Wars, the victors established a principled order de-
signed to promote stability, prevent conflict, and uphold autocratic rule (Taylor, 1954; Jervis,
1985; Schroeder, 1996). The German kingdoms also moved to promote unification through
consolidating relationships and creating a pan-Germanic confederation (Schroeder, 1996,
599-606). While the order was designed to prevent conflict, force was occasionally seen as
necessary to prolong the post-Napoleonic order (Schroeder, 1996, 736-740). As such, states
would be expected to adopt the role of Balancer, Consolidator, or occasionally, Aggregator.
During the Vienna System, the period spanning 1816 to 1848, a role-structure consisting
of three roles, Consolidators, Balancers, and Aggregators, is uncovered and found to produce
superior model fit according to BIC. Table 2 presents the parameters used for this (and all
other) ego-TERGM(s) fit. Overall, the a priori expectation is confirmed: states appear to
either adopt the role of Consolidator, Balancer, or a variation of Aggregator. Results for
this period are presented in Figure 3.9
First, one set of roles were adopted by the smaller kingdoms that were member to the
German Confederation. The German Confederation, made up of kingdoms like Bavaria and
Hanover, as well as powers like Austria and Prussia, was a means of promoting economic
and regional stability (Schroeder, 1996).10 The model’s selection of these states to include
in the same cluster, and not the powerful German Confederation members like Prussia or
Austria, is indication that these states may have formed a series of alliances to consolidate
and bring order to existing economic and political ties. This is consistent with the previously
9To understand the relative contribution of each model term, a sensitivity-based approach is utilized.
This routine and its results for each period are discussed in the Si Appendix.
10Note that the names discussed here are their historical names while the names presented in in the role
assignment figures contain their Correlates of War System Membership Data legacy names. For example,
Correlates of War labels Prussia as its later legacy Germany, and labels the Ottoman Empire as its later
legacy Turkey. This naming is preserved to ensure consistency throughout the manuscript.
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Figure 3: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Vienna Sys-
tem. Darker cells show higher probabilities of assignment to a particular role. Country
labels refer to their Correlates of War System Membership Data name which may include
legacy names for latter periods.
discussed Consolidator role and the expectation of diplomatic history (Schroeder, 1996).
Second, the powers of the German Confederation, Austria and Prussia, are found to
adopt a role distinct from their German Confederation co-members that closely resembles
the Balancers role. These two states are partners to the well known Holy Alliance (and
later the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances) formed to maintain the Vienna System and
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its set of norms. Initially this alliance was formed between Austria, Prussia, and Russia to
make the world safe for monarchs, but was expanded to include the United Kingdom and
France as to maintain norms against violence and ensure an adequate balance of power by
creating a dominant order-preserving coalition (Taylor, 1954; Jervis, 1985; Schroeder, 1996;
Bridge and Bullen, 2014). This is in contrast to the expectations of Schroeder (1992, 1996)
who argued that the Vienna System did not rest upon a balance of power, and that during
this time the powers did not view power aggregation as essential to sustaining the system.
France, Great Britain, and Russia are not included in the analysis for this period as they
never ally with at least five other states. This logic, and the motivation for the alliances
formed by Austria and Prussia at this time, is consistent with the Balancers role discussed
in Section 3.
The third and final role identified is solely constituted by the Ottoman Empire (modernly,
Turkey). During the Vienna System, the Ottoman Empire found itself party to a multi-state
alliance for several months in 1840. This alliance alliance was formed to ensure Egypt would
accept a peaceful negotiated settlement to the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841).
This case reflects a particularly odd dynamic rarely considered – alliances formed as a
means of promoting dispute resolution through resource aggregation. This alliance was not
formed prior to the conduct of conflict and as such does not cleanly match the logic of the
Aggregators role. Instead it represents a variation on this logic, resources aggregated after
conflict to incentivize a winning party’s acceptance of a negotiated settlement, as opposed
to continue executing the conflict for additional gains. This version of the Aggregators role,
however, is consistent with historical intuition per Schroeder (1996, 736-740) as the Ottoman
multi-state alliance was ultimately formed in an effort to prevent the collapse of the Vienna
System.
It is worth noting that Russia, France, and the United Kingdom are conspicuously omit-
ted from my analyses. The reasons are a result of model identifiability – during no period do
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the local alliance networks of any of these countries contain enough states to allow a model
to be estimated. For example, during this time the UK typically only has three alliances,
having four alliances with Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire in
1840. An ego-network of this size often provides insufficient variation or evidence to allow
for a model to be estimated. This is not ideal from a historical perspective, but it is not
obvious what alternative would be suitable and allow for these states’ inclusion.
5.1.2 Bismarckian System Roles
The Bismarckian System, which spans 1849 to 1890, begins as a series of revolutions spread
across Europe. These revolutions make it likely that Reformers will emerge in an effort to
nudge states either towards or away from democracy (Craig and George, 1995). In addition,
many conflicts, most notably the Austro-Prussian War, occur that might lead states to
adopt the Aggregators role (Craig and George, 1995). Under Bismarck, German unification
escalates, the German kingdoms would likely continue to adopt the role of Consolidator as
they attempt to transition to a Unified Germany with Bismarck at the helm (Hartshorne,
1950). During the Bismarckian System, four distinct roles are detected and G and found
to produce the best fitting model according to BIC. The role assignments for this period,
presented in Figure 4, demonstrate a great degree of variation that is mostly consistent with
theoretical and historical intuition.
Similar to the prior period, many German kingdoms find themselves clustered in the
same role with a relatively high degree of certainty. The inclusion of Prussia and Austria
within this role alongside many smaller German kingdoms indicates two significant legacies
of Bismarck’s foreign policy. During this time, Bismarck used many of the alliances with the
German kingdoms as a means of consolidating existing relationships in an effort to further
promote German Unification (Hartshorne, 1950). However, it is quite clear that Bismarck
also saw his chief role as a Balancer and through a thoughtfully engineered alliance system
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Figure 4: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Bismarckian
System.
which included Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, he sought to promote stability (Craig
and George, 1995; Snyder, 1997). As such Prussia and Austria appear to be mixture of
Consolidators and Balancers.
On the outside of Bismarck’s alliance system often laid France, whom this League of
the Three Emperors with Austria and Russia was designed to exclude. Intuitively then
France is in a separate role with the United Kingdom and Ottoman Empire. This clustering
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make sense as the Ottoman Empire and England often found themselves at odds with the
League of the Three Emperors (Taylor, 1954; Snyder, 1997). These states, on the outside of
Bismarck’s core, do not appear to reflect any of the roles discussed in Section 3 and appear
to be on the outside of a core-periphery system. As a counter-weight to Bismarck’s order-
preserving and balancing coalition, France, the Ottoman Empire, and England too appeared
to have adopted the Balancers role.
The third role is solely constituted by Ecuador with very low-level probabilities of assign-
ment from Germany and Austria. As there are no other countries in Latin America, little
alone the Western Hemisphere, who have at least five alliances at this time, they appear
to be the most active state with respect to alliance politics. During this period Ecuador
collaborated with many other countries, including Peru, Chile, and Bolivia against Spain in
the Chincha Islands War. They are also engaged in three other conflicts during this period,
which seems to indicate that they adopted a role most consistent with the Aggregators role
as they seemed to be constantly engaged in conflict and as such, behooved to find wartime
partners. The low-level probabilities of assignment for Austria and Prussia also make sense
as for a brief time they prepared for and engaged in the Austro-Prussian war.
The final role reflects the Reformers role, and is constituted largely by Italy with all
Consolidators having a low-level probability of assignment. Following 1848, revolution spread
across Europe, dramatically changing its geopolitical landscape (Taylor, 1954; Schroeder,
1996; Bridge and Bullen, 2014). In particular, these revolutions shaped the foreign policy
trajectories of Italy, Austria, and Germany. In particular, the revolts in Italy had geopolitical
implications that ultimately unraveled the European Order and brought France and Austria
to battle over Italian independence in 1859 and Italy and Austria to fight in 1866. With
each conflict, Austria’s hold on Italy weakened and a path for Italian unification was paved.
As Italy became increasingly independent, France and England used their clout and alliance
ties with Italy to push for Italian independence and democratization. As such, Italy can be
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described as a Reformer.
5.1.3 Pre-World War I System Roles
The Pre-World War 1 period, spanning 1891 to 1918, represents a tumultuous time wherein
Bismarck’s sophisticated alliance system was handed to a set of diplomats that many con-
sidered to be professionally incompetent (Taylor, 1954; Kissinger, 1994). During this period
the lasting effects of Bismarck’s realpolitik system are felt and as competition between states
increased, there were increased pressures for states to arm and aggregate power. This system
appears to be a much simpler role system than the prior periods, as two role are detected
and found to produce optimal model fit according to BIC. Results presented in Figure 5
show support for historical expectation as Balancers and Aggregators are both dominant.
Overall, the the theoretical intuition is corroborated to some degree, although the prediction
that Aggregators would be more prevalent than Balancers is not confirmed.
The first role is solely composed of Russia, who during the lead up to World War I would
go on to be a member of the Triple Entente with Great Britain and France. Russia was
particularly unique from its Triple Entente counterparts, however, in that they increasingly
expansionist and turned their eye on the Far East (Kissinger, 1994). Nicholas II was of
the opinion, among many others, that being a great power required territorial expansion
(Kissinger, 1994). This expansion made it clear that Russia was accruing alliances for the
purpose of aggregating its power and expanding its influence. As such, Russia appears to
have adopted the Aggregators role.
The second role is composed by the remaining states who have at least five allies during
this time: United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Romania. Many
of the states adopting this role are members of either the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance
which are alliances thought to be formed to balance other great powers (Taylor, 1954). The
Triple Alliance, for example, was designed to balance against France and to prevent attack
33
Ag
gr
eg
at
or
s
Ba
la
nc
er
s
United Kingdom
Russia
Romania
Italy
Germany
France
Austria−Hungary
Roles
St
at
e
Figure 5: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Pre-World
War 1 System.
on Italy or Germany. The Triple Entente was mostly formed as a counterweight to the Triple
Alliance. As such, I would refer to these states as Balancers.
5.1.4 Interwar System Roles
After World War I, the role structure of world politics became much more complicated
(Carr, 1939; Siverson and McCarty, 1982; Kissinger, 1994). While attempts were made to
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Figure 6: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Interwar
System.
consolidate relationships through the failed League of Nations or to promote liberal reforms,
there are were many salient cases of state competition (Carr, 1939). As such, it is unclear
what the role structuring principles of this period were. Given this expected heterogeneity
(Siverson and McCarty, 1982), it is interesting that a homogenous role system consisting of
only one role is found to produce superior model fit. Results from the model are presented
in Figure 6. While theoretical expectation would expect to find some combination of roles,
only Consolidators were detected
The estimation of any model with G > 1 produces a more poorly fitting model when
accounting for the penalization of additional roles through BIC. This indicates that the
ego-network for all states included in the model appear similar, at least with respect to the
covariates specified. During this time the post-WW1 order was created and states began to
focus upon the consolidation of political and economic relationships to maintain the broader
international order established in Versailles (Carr, 1939; Kissinger, 1994; Craig and George,
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1995). This is not precisely consistent with theoretical logic, as it may be expected that
states also form alliances in an effort to aggregate power to counter a rising Germany or to
prepare for conflict (Siverson and McCarty, 1982; Kissinger, 1994).
5.1.5 Bipolar System Roles
This bipolar system emerges in 1946 and lasts until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991. Following the resolution of World War II international politics began to organize along
two distinct alliance blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. With that being said, however, it
does not seem clear that states within each of these blocs form alliances for distinct reasons
as they are members of coalitions balancing each other. As previously discussed, this period
should be dominated by Aggregators, Balancers, and Consolidators. Four roles are detected
and found to produce the best fitting model according to BIC. Of these roles, 133 different
states are assigned to three different roles. Intriguingly, in addition to the roles expected,
adding an additional role is found to improve model fit. However, no state has a probability
of assignment to this role greater than 0.00001. We refer to this as the Reformers role,
which while likely to be rare at this point, may still exist in generality. This model is
estimated according to the parameters discussed in Table 2. We will discuss these four roles,
highlighting particularly powerful states that adopt these roles. Results from this model are
presented in Figure 7 and largely consistent with prior expectation.
The first role contains the most number of states and is reflective of the Balancers role.
Among these members are prominent early NATO countries, including the United States,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, and France, but also late comers such as Turkey
and Spain. Additionally, all Warsaw Pact countries excluding Albania are included in this
role. During this period these two alliance blocs commonly formed alliances as a means of
containing and balancing the influence of the other (Waltz, 1993; Kissinger, 1994).
The second role is predominantly constituted by smaller states that do not directly
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Figure 7: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Bipolar Sys-
tem.
participate in either of these alliance blocs (except Albania). Many of these countries are
early and late coming members of the OAS, such as Brazil, Argentina, and St. Lucia, while
others are members of the Arab League, such as Algeria or Tunisia. During this time many
of these alliances were formed to consolidate existing ties through promoting coordination
and cooperation (Lebow, 1994). These motives are consistent with the Consolidators role as
states formed alliances to institutionalize existing ties. While the United States may have
been using the OAS as an opportunity to balance Soviet influence and promote western-style
modernization, it appear that many of its OAS allies may have had different motives, viewing
the alliance as an opportunity to consolidate their relationship with each other and with the
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hegemon (Weeks, 1991; Mikoyan, 2018). This may be useful as a regime’s support from the
United States may have predicted the United States’ support for the regime and thus its
survival. (Slater, 2008; Stodden and Weiss, 2016) In such cases, participation within the
OAS may have been useful for consolidating economic and political relationships, producing
a series of positive externalities, but such participation may not have been totally voluntary
(Weeks, 1991; Slater, 2008; Stodden and Weiss, 2016).11
The last role discovered, adopted by Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo, appears to be a variation of the Aggregators
role wherein states form a larger institution to aggregate power in an effort to bring order to
a region and respond to internal threats. Many of these states are party to the Defense Pact
of the African and Malagasy Union or the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), both institutions designed to uphold norms against territorial aggression and
military confrontation in Africa through aggregating capabilities and deterring armed conflict
(Ukeje, 2005).
5.1.6 Liberal International System Roles
The final role system considered is that of the Liberal International System that emerges
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and is considered until 2002, the last
year collected in ATOP. During this time the US has its “unipolar moment” which radically
transformed international politics and created a new order based upon liberal international
norms (Ikenberry, 2012, 2014). New constraints on competitive behavior has lead states
to use alliances to accomplish nonconventional objectives consistent with the Reformer or
Consolidator roles (Pevehouse, 2005). During this period a model is estimated according to
11There has been a great amount of highlighting that many of the asymmetric relationships during this
time were coercive and marred by the use of colonial and imperial power (Slater, 2008). As such, one
might view the hegemon as exercising power over the subaltern to ensure that the subaltern participates in
alliances in an effort to consolidate the asymmetric relationship and bolster the perceived legitimacy of the
American-promoted liberal internationalist order (Slater, 2008).
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Figure 8: Ego-TERGM Role Assignment Probabilities by Country, Liberal In-
ternational System.
the parameters in Table 2. A role structure consisting of four roles is detected and found
to produce optimal model fit according to BIC. As is with the prior case, 158 countries are
assigned to three different roles even though four roles are fit. Results from the ego-TERGM
fit on this period are presented in Figure 8, which present results that are largely in line
with theoretical expectation.
The first role is constituted by the most countries and is reflective of a process where
many states view military alliances as an opportunity to promote some broader order through
institution building. This is representative of the Reformers role. This primarily includes
countries within the OAS which are party to its renewed mission and effort to promote a
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regional security community based upon respect for democracy, free trade, and cooperative
security (The´rien, Mace, and Gagne´, 2012). During this time, many of the democracies
within the OAS pushing autocracies to liberalize through the Unit for the Promotion of
Democracy (UPD), such as the democratic United States and Mexico tied to autocracies
like Venezuela, Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua (Pevehouse, 2005; Slater, 2008; The´rien,
Mace, and Gagne´, 2012). Parallel narratives also emerge within NATO and ECOWAS,
wherein former security institutions adopt a renewed mission of assisting states in pursuing
reforms and promoting a regional security community or order (Adler, 2008).
The second role is constituted by many other peripheral states that are active outside of
NATO (while including some NATO member countries). Many of these states, like France
and Russia, have at times resisted the liberal international order promoted by the United
States. As such, it does not seem clear that these states adopt the Reformers role, and at
the same time, do not appear to cleanly fit into any other roles. Many of these states may
be more reflective of an unexpected Aggregators role as many participate in conflict during
this time.
The third and final role closely resembles the Consolidators role and is constituted by a
set of African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries who have formed alliance-based institu-
tions like the Arab League or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These institutions
are largely means to prevent aggression and provide an institutional means to consolidate
existing economic, political, or cultural relationships and promote cooperation.
5.2 Assessing the Role Generative Structure
To assess the generative structure of the roles uncovered by the ego-TERGM, four boot-
strapped pseudolikelihood TERGMs are fit on all ego-networks associated with each role
for each systemic period. This routine, introduced by Campbell (2018), allows analysts to
understand the network features that are prevalent or not for all networks associated with
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a role.12 The models presented here are the best fitting identifiable models associated with
each role.13
Results for this routine are presented in Table 3.14 Overall, the results illustrate that
the observed role-generating processes pretty closely mirrors the expected role-generating
processes. The pooled TERGM fit on all Balancer ego-networks finds a tendency towards
high-degree nodes, marked by a positive and robust effect for GW Degree, and triadic closure,
found by a positive and robust effect for the Triangles term. This makes sense as Balancers
may create large and tightly knit coalitions to legitimize their ideal international order
(Adler, 2008; Adler and Greve, 2009; Ikenberry, 2014). In addition, the model also discovers
a tendency towards regime homophily and capability heterophily, marked by positive and
robust effects for both the Regime Homophily and CINC Difference terms respectively.
Balancers may be more likely to bring in weaker states to further illustrate the breadth
of support for their ideal order, but this desire for a breadth of support may be constrained
by foreign policy preferences that stem from regime type (Gartzke, 1998, 2000).
The Aggregators model also uncovers results consistent with theoretical expectation.
Aggregators’ ego-networks have a tendency towards both triadic closure and high-degree
nodes, indicating fairly large and tightly knit alliance clusters that would produce synergetic
gains to state security (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland, 2012; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Menninga, 2012). In addition, it also appears that Aggregators are more likely to form
alliances with states of similar regime types. This makes sense as Aggregators must form
alliances with states they can trust given the potential security costs of ally renegement (Lai
and Reiter, 2000; Gartzke, 2000). Finally, Aggregators do not illustrate a strong tendency
to form symmetric alliances over asymmetric alliances. Theoretical expectation would hold
12For additional discussion of the TERGM estimated through bootstrapped pseudolikelihood, I refer the
reader to Cranmer and Desmarais (2010).
13In the SI Appendix, TERGMs fit on each role for each time period are introduced and discussed. For
additional detail on the covariates used for these TERGMs that are not used for the ego-TERGM, the reader
is referred to the SI Appendix.
14Goodness of fit diagnostics for these models are presented in the SI Appendix.
41
that Aggregators would be more likely to seek allies with similar capabilities (Morrow, 1991).
However, as noted, a null effect may also be expected as alliance choices are constrained by
the allies willing to collaborate with the state in an inevitable conflict.
The estimated role generating process for Consolidators’ ego-networks shows a tendency
towards high-degree nodes and triadic closure. This is consistent with a priori expectation as
Consolidators may use alliances to create communities for the purpose of easing political or
economic tie consolidation among all members. The pooled TERGMs also reveal a tendency
towards regime type heterophily within these ego-networks, which makes sense as alliances
are often used to build trust (Kydd, 2001) or produce converging interests through social-
ization (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007). Existing theory may also expect that asymmetric
alliances provide a means of producing concessions between states of disparate capabili-
ties through allowing both states to extract distinct gains through side payments (Morrow,
1991; Fordham, 2010). We find support for this function, as it appears that Consolidators’
ego-networks have a tendency towards alliances formed between states of disparate national
capabilities.
Finally, a pooled TERGM is fit on all ego-networks associated with the Reformers role.
Results from this model are largely consistent with the preceding discussion. These ego-
networks show a tendency towards high-degree nodes and triadic closure. This would indicate
support for the proposition that Reformers seek to include many states in a tightly knit
institution, which may assist in socializing member states (Pevehouse, 2005). In addition,
it is expected that the alliances constituting Reformers’ ego-networks are more likely to be
asymmetric with respect to capabilities. This is because stronger states may be more able to
effectively exercise influence over weaker states when pushing for domestic reforms (Morrow,
1991). Finally, it would be expected that the alliances formed by Reformers are between
states of different regimes. Democracies may more effectively socialize autocratic peers as
they’d be seen as more legitimate (Pevehouse, 2005). In this case, the positive effect for
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Balancers Aggregators Consolidators Reformers
Edges −5.95∗ −5.93∗ −1.91∗ −6.22∗
[−6.31; −5.63] [−6.69; −4.87] [−2.18; −1.64] [−6.82; −5.64]
Triangles 0.97∗ 0.60∗ 0.40∗ 0.53∗
[0.88; 1.08] [0.45; 0.76] [0.35; 0.50] [0.42; 0.61]
GW Degree (0.1) 7.86∗ 3.71∗ 3.31∗ 19.18∗
[7.19; 8.89] [0.34; 6.45] [2.86; 3.96] [14.65; 24.27]
CINC Difference 13.24∗ 2.42 8.52∗ 15.93∗
[12.20; 14.30] [−41.46; 13.85] [6.81; 10.25] [13.67; 18.44]
Revisionism Difference 0.13∗ −0.37∗ −0.23∗ −0.02
[0.03; 0.22] [−0.68; −0.08] [−0.34; −0.13] [−0.18; 0.14]
Regime Homophily 0.72∗ 0.54∗ −0.60∗ 0.71∗
[0.62; 0.81] [0.43; 0.65] [−0.76; −0.44] [0.53; 0.89]
Defensive Commitments 1.34∗ 1.31∗ 2.11∗ 2.79∗
[1.14; 1.55] [0.57; 1.94] [1.82; 2.39] [2.43; 3.23]
Offensive Commitments 1.12∗ 2.59∗
[0.90; 1.36] [1.06; 19.87]
Secret Provisions 0.76∗
[0.53; 0.95]
Degree of Institutionalization 0.30 −3.16 0.01 −0.32
[−0.10; 0.67] [−4.21; 4.96] [−0.29; 0.22] [−1.23; 0.43]
Alliance Years 0.06∗ 1.24∗ 0.02∗ 0.06∗
[0.04; 0.07] [0.77; 1.99] [0.01; 0.03] [0.03; 0.10]
Num. obs. 463658 612609 127956 269440
∗ 0 outside the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval
Table 3: Pooled TERGM Results for Role Generative Structure, All Periods.
95% confidence intervals estimated through bootstrapped pseudolikelihood. 500 replications.
regime homophily is not consistent with theoretical expectation. One potential explanation
is that reforms have already been implemented, and the model is observing the post-reform
tendency for these institutions to persist even after reforms have been made.
6 Concluding Thoughts
In this manuscript a novel role-based approach to considering alliances is introduced. This
framework breaks with the restrictive and conventional assumption that alliances are ho-
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mogenous institutions formed in response to external threats. It also provides a logic nec-
essary to empirically evaluate the rich, nuanced based view of alliances championed by
diplomatic historians and security studies scholars. My framework recognizes that states
have a variety of objectives that they consider when forming interstate military institutions.
Results indicate that there are many roles made available to states in the alliance network.
These roles, which are informed by contextual factors, influence how and why states form
alliances. This framework and its roles, inferred by the flexible and novel ego-TERGM, offers
analysts a new take on perhaps the most foundational concept in IR. The roles uncovered
across distinct historical periods indicate that there is great heterogeneity in the generative
model of alliances, and that the motives driving states to form alliances vary across states,
space, and time.
The roles detected by this routine confirm that our initial understanding of military
alliances has long been flawed. This may indicate that many of our theories and empirical
models of alliances have been misspecified because they have failed to account for why the
alliances were formed in the first place. Consider any study on alliances, whether it be on
the effect of alliances on trade, conflict, or democratization. By assuming that alliances
are formed for the same purpose, empirical models have problematically pooled alliances
formed by Balancers or Aggregators with those formed by Reformers or Consolidators and
assumed that their effects are constant. This misspecification plagues both theoretical and
empirical work by failing to properly specify the necessary scope conditions about the types
of alliances that may be relevant.
This new framework offers a fresh take on many old and important questions. Instead of
just thinking about the dynamics of different commitments, IR scholars may now empirically
consider the dynamics associated with different alliance roles. In other words, this new
framework allows us to ask a variety of new questions: Are alliances formed by Balancers to
restrain peer competitors successful? When Aggregators form alliances to prepare for conflict,
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do they deter it, or produce it? Are Consolidators successful in using alliances to consolidate
economic or political ties? When Reformers use alliances to promote economic or political
liberalization, do their allies liberalize? How heterogeneous is the international system? How
does a state’s engagement with world politics evolve?
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